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TN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCIO SMITH,

Ca~e No. 20160106

Plaintiff-Appellant~
vs.
KAYELYN ROBINSON, LCSW,

Defendant-Appellee.

REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

***
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a district court order dismissing a health care malpractice
claim brought by plaintiff Rocio Smith ("Mother") against defendant Kayelyn Robinson,
LCSW ("Therapist"). Dismissal was ordered by the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Spanish Fork Division, the Honorable James Brady, presiding. This Court originally
transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals w1der Utah Code Ann.§§ 78A-3102(4), 78A-4-103(2)(j) (Westlaw 2016). However, after briefing to the court of appeals
was completed, this Court recalled the case, and then authorized supplemental or
replacement briefing. This Replacement Brief responds to the one filed by Mother.
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL,
STANDARD OF APPELLATE RRVTR\V,
and
ISSUE PRESERV ATTON

Therapist identifies one issue on appeal, departing from Mother's two identified
issues, as permitted by Utah R. App. ]?,_24.(hl(l}. The issue is:

I: Did the distiict court correctly dismiss Mother's malpractice claim against
Therapist, based upon its holding that Therapist, as an adverse witness to Mother in
underlying litigation, owed no duty to Mother? Appellate review of an order granting a

motion to dismiss, or a motion for summary judgment, is non-deferential. E.g.,
Candelaria v. CB Richard Ellis. et al., 2014 UT App 1, ~ 5,319 P.3d 708, 709-710. Also:
"The issue of whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be detennined by the

court.'' Joseph. v. McCann, 2006 UT App 459, ,I 10, 147 P.3d 547 (quoting authority),
cert. denied, 168 P.3d 339 (Utah 2007). Thjs "duty'' issue was presented in the defense

motion to dismiss, in the district court. (Corrected Mot. to Dismiss, R. 141-144.)
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES

While some statutes are implicated in Therapist's argument, none is detenninative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case statement departs from Mother's. For a clearer presentation, the defense
begins with a recitation of underlying child custody litigation that gave rise to the district
court lawsuit that is the direct subject of this appeal. And although the district court
treated Therapist's dispositive motion as a motion to dismiss (R. 284, in Appellee's
2
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Replacement Addendum§ 4), the defense presented it, alternatively, as a motion for
viP

summary judgment, and supported it with material outside the pleadings-in particular,
rulings in the underlying child custody litigation-in which Therapist had been a witness.
We proceed similarly in this Court

as does Mother.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and
Disposition in the District Court
The Undcr(ving Child Custody Litigation.
This case arises from a bitter child custody dispute that pitted Mother (plaintiff
Rocio Smith) against her ex-husband ("Father'') and his new wife ("Stepmother").
Stepmother engaged Therapist, a social worker, to provide therapy to the two subject
children. Subsequently, Father and Stepmother called Therapist as a witness in a child
custody trial, seel~g termination of Mother's parental rights based upon their allegation
that Mother had abused the children. The trial was held in a juvenile cow1 (the "custody
,~

court"), and Therapist's testimony supported the abuse allegation.
Her testimony did not persuade the custody court, which decided the child custody
dispute in favor of Mother. In its decision, the custody court harshly criticized Therapist.
The court also found Father and Stepmother in contempt for misconduct during the child
custody litigation, and ordered them to pay Mother's attorney fees and court costs.
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, hereinafter "custody decision," R.
153-217, in Appellee's Rcpl. Addendum§ 1.) The custody decision was affirmed on

~

appeal as to custody of the children, but vacated for a hearing on the contempt issue.

3
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Mother's District Court Lawsuit.
Subsequently, Mother sued Therapi8t in a district court. Mother assc1ted two
claims: one for malpractice, and the other fur negligent infHction of emotional distress.
(Complaint, 32-51, R. 1-8, in Appdlee's Replacement Addendum§ 2.)
After filing her aJ.IBwer, Therapist filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a
motion for summary judgment. Addressing malpractice, Therapist argued that she owed
no duty of care, toward Mother, that could support the malpractice claim. (R. 141-144.)
Addressing negligent infliction of emotional distress, Therapist argued that the "distress"
alleged by Mother was insufficient to support that claim. (R. 144-150.)
After briefing and oral argument, the district court granted the motion to dismiss
both of Mother's claims, explaining its reasoning in a written ruling. (R. 284-294, in
Appel1ee's Repl. Addendwn § 4.) It then entered a final dismissal order. (R. 302.) Mother
appeals the dismissal of her malpractice claim. She does not appeal the dismissal of her
''NIED" claim. (Replacement Br. of Appellant p. 5-6, Statement of Issues.)

Facts Relevant to the Issue Presented on Appeal
The defense focuses on/acts that are presumed true or are undisputed, for
purposes of deciding a dispositive motion. The district court observed that conclusory
assertions are not treated as facts. (R. 284-285, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 4.) We
draw the facts from Mother's Complaint, as well as from the custody decision, from
which Mother's Complaint borrowed heavily. The district court's fact recitation, by and
large, was consistent with these sources.
4
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1. Father and Mother were divorced in July 2008. In November 2008, the decree was
vi;

amended to provide "joint legal custody'' of their two young children (born August
2004 & November 2006), with visitation rights to Mother. (Complaint, 9-10, R. 2,

~

in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2; custody decision ii 7-8, R. 155, in Repl.
Addendum§ 1.)
2. After the divorce, Father married Stepmother. From September 2008 onward, the

\;j)

Utah Division of Child and Farntly Services (DCFS) investigated multiple
accusations, by Father and Stepmother, that Mother wa<; neglecting or abusing the

.;;;;

children. (Complaint, 11, R. 3, in Repl. Addendum§ 2; custody decision 111-15,
17, R. 156-158, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.)

~

3. Three of those accusations led to "supported findings" by DCFS against Mother,
for maltreatment of the children. (Custody decision,, 11, 12, 17, R. 156-158, in
Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.) Those accusations, and the DCFS investigations

l.iJ

of same, resulted in the interruption of Mother's child visitation rights for varying
time periods, once for nearly two years. (Id.,, 15, 18.)
141)

4. In February 2011, Father and Stepmother petitioned the custody court to terminate
Mother's parental rights over the children. Mother counter-petitioned, asking to
terminate Father's parental rights. (Complaint, 12, R. 3, in Appellee's Repl.
Addendum § 2; custody decision p. 1-2, R. 153-154, in Repl. Addendum§ 1.)

5
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5. At that time, Therapist was providing mental health therapy to the children, having
been previously hired by Stepmother for that purpose. (Complaint ,I,I 13-14, 21, R.
3-4, in Appe11ee's Rcpl. Addendwn § 2.)
6. Therapist became involved in the chi Id custm.ly dispute, and eventually was a
witness at the custody tri<tl, called hy Father and Stepmother. (Custody decision, R.
169-172, in Appcllcc's Rcpl. Addendum§ 1.)
7. Mother alleges that Therapist c.01m11itted misconduct. while ~he wa.;; serving as the
children's therapist, in connection with the child custody litigation. Those
allegations included the following:
a.

Therapist opined, to the cuslo<ly court., that Mother had sexually abused the
children. (Complaint ,I 48, R. 7, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2; custody
decision ,I 62, R. 170, in Repl. Addendum § 1.)

b.

However, in rnaching that opinion, Therapist "uncritically accepted"
Stepmother's statements about the alleged abuse, without recognizing that they
may have been influenced by Father's and Stepmother's position in the child
custody litigation. (Complaint ,r 16, R. 3, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2;
custody decision ,r 62, R. 170, in Repl. Addendum § 1.)

c.

Based upon her belief that the children had been abused, Therapist "actively
advocated against" Mother in the child custody litigation, and worked with
Father and Stepmother to "protect" the children from Mother. (Complaint ,I 17,

6
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R. 3, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2; custody decision ,r 59, R. 169-170, in
Repl. Addendum§ 1.)

d.

Therapist "activdy opposed" a custody cowt order, supported by a courtappointed custody evaluator, for independent observation of the inkradions
between the children and Mother. (Complaint ,r 19-20, R. 3, in Appellee's
Repl. Addendum § 2; custody decision ,r 60, R. 170, in Repl. Addendum § 1.)

8. 1n November 2011, the custody court ordered Therapist to terminate her therapy
services to the children, and to have no further contact with them. (Complaint ,r 21,
R. 4, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2; custody decision ,r 61, R. 170, in Repl.
Addendum§ 1; custody court Nov. 10, 2011 order, R. 131.)
9. Mother alleges that after being discharged as the children's therapist, Therapist
committed the following acts:
a.

Therapist continued to have contact with the children. (Complaint ,r 22, R.
4, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2.) This looks like an overstatement.
According to the custody court, Therapist attempted to observe a supervised
visit between Mother and the children, at the behest of Stepmother. (Custody
decision ,r 64, R. 171, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.)

b.

Therapist continued to "uncritically accept" the statements of Stepmother
"to the detriment of the minor children and [Mother]." (Complaint ,r 23, R. 4, in
Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2.)

7
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c.

Therapist recruited another therapy patient, wrrelated to the custody case, to
surreptitiously record the comt-appointed custody evaluator. To persuade the
other patient to do this, Therapist allegedly made a "what if they were your
children?" sympathy pitch to her. (Complaint ,r 25, in Appellee's Repl.
Addendum § 2.)

d.

Therapist improperly used somebody else's key to enter the therapy office
(Utah Family Institute, or "UFI") where she had fonnerly worked, to access the
children's protected therapy records. (Complaint iJ 26, R. 4, in Appellee's Repl.
Addendum§ 2; custody decision iJ 66, R. 172, in Repl. Addendum§ 2.)

e.

Without releases to do so, Therapist dispersed information about the
children, from those records, to the custody dispute parties, attorneys, and the
custody court. (Complaint iJ 27, R. 4, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum 2; custody
decision ,r 66, R. 172, in Rcpl. Addendum § 2.)

10. Eventually, the custody dispute-between Father and Stepmother on one side, and
Mother on the other-proceeded to trial. The custody trial spanned nearly six
months, in 23 sessions, from late March 2012 to early September 2012. (Custody
decision, R. 153-154, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.)
11. Participation in the custody trial was not limited to Therapist's testimony. The
custody court referenced multiple investigations by the Utah Division of Child and
Family Services. (Custody decision, R. 156-157 if 14-17, 165 ,r 43, in Appellee's
Rep1. Addendum § I.) The Utah Attorney General's office was involved. (Id., R.
8
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153.) Psychosexual and polygraph examinations were done. (Id., R. 158 ,r 19-20.)
The c.ow1-appointed examiner attempted a parental fitness and parent time
evaluation, but was obstructed by Father and Stepmother; he did eventually testify.
(Id., R. 159-160 ,I 24-27, 175-179 ii 76-84.) An entity described a~ "ACAFS"
submitted child visitation reports. (Id., R. 162 ii 162.) At least two other therapist"
for the children testified. (Id., R. 163 ,I 36-37, R. 167-169 ii 49-56.) A diildren's
shelter nurse testified. (Id., R. 172-173 ,r 68-69.)
12. Called as a witness by Father and Stepmother, Therapist's testimony supported
.Fatherts and Stepmother's allegation that Mother had sexually abu~ed the children,
which the custody court called the "primary and most serious allegation in this
matter ...." (Custody decision ,r 47, R. 166, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.)
13. ln April 2013, over a year after convening trial, the custody court issued its 65page child custody decision. The custody court rejected the child sex abuse
allegation against Mother, finding that Father's and Stepmother's evidence,
presented in support of that allegation, was not credible. (Custody decision ,I 47112, R. 166-189, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.) 1
14. Before addressing Therapist's testimony, the custody court addressed the
testimony of a predecessor therapist for the children. The predecessor therapist
evidently opined that the children had been abused by Mother. The custody court

1

The custody decision contains duplicate paragraph8 numbered 112 and 113, but with
different content. (R. 189-190.)
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found that testimony to be non-credible. (Custody decision ,r 49-56, R. 167-169, in
Appellee' s Rep1. Addcndmn § I.)
15. Turning to Therapist's testimony, the custody comi detailed its reasons for rinding
that her opinion, in support of the sex abuse allegation, was not credible. Those
reasons included Therapist's "uncritical acceptance" of information tending to
show that the children had been abused, and various actions taken by Therapist
based upon her abuse opinion-such as opposing the court-ordered parent-child
evaluation. The court also condemned Therapist's recruitment of the other therapy
patient to record the court-appointed evaluator, and her retrieval of records from
her former office. The court opined that "[Therapist]'s actions in this matter were
at best biased, and at worst tortious or criminal." (Custody decision 'if 57-67, R.
169-172, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.)
16. The custody court also rebuked Father and Stepmother, finding that they had
"behaved like individuals with both a vendetta and a hidden agenda." (Custody
decision ,r 92, R. 181-182, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.) The court found
that Father and Stepmother had manipulated the children, and misrepresented the
statements of professionals, to support their accusations of abuse. (Id. ,r 70-75, R.
173-17 5.) After numerous other criticisms (id. ,r 93-102, R. 182-186), the custody
court found that Father's and Stepmother's "perceptions are deeply biased,
misinformed and/or based on malice," and that their credibility was "severely
damaged." (Id. 'if 103, R. 185-186.)

10
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17. The custody court did not only find that Father and Stepmother had failed to prove
that Mother had abused the children. It wc;nt even fwther, stating: "[T]he Court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Mother did not sexually abuse [the
children l and hereby exonerates her." (Custody decision ,I 113, R. 189, in
Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1, emphasis in original.)
18. Accordingly, the custody court entered no less than eighteen orders, including:

a.

Denial, with prejudice, of Father's and Stepmother's petition to terminate
Mother's parental rights. (Custody decision ,I 195, R. 213, in Appellee's Repl.
Addendum § 1.)

b.

Partial grant of Mother's count.er-petition to tenninate Father's and
Stepmother's parental rights. (Id. ,I 196, R. 213.)

c.

Setting a primary goal to reunify the children with Mother. (Id. ,I 199-200,
R. 213-214.)

d.

Significant curtailment of Father's and Stepmother's contact with the
children. (Id. ,I 204, R. 215.)

e.

Ordering Father and Stepmother to pay "all legal fees, costs and expenses
incurred by [Mother] in prosecuting her claims and defending against [Father's
and Stepmother's] claims." (Id. ,I 205, R. 215.)

~

f.

Found Father and Stepmother in contempt of court, seven counts;
suspended jail time for same, on condition that they pay Mother's attorney fees
and costs within ninety days. (Id. ,I 208, R. 216.)

11
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19.

Father and Stepmother appealed the custody decision. The Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed as to custody of the children, holding that Father's and
Stepmother's appellate brief on that issue was inadequate. The court vacated the
contempt findiug, remanding that issue for a hearing. ln re E.S. & NS., 2013 UT

App 222_ 310 P.3d 744 (per curiam).
20.

ln opposing Therapist's motion to dismiss Mother's subsequent district
court lawsuit, Mother reported that she had been unable to collect attorney fees
and costs from Father and Stepmother. She did not say whether the custody court
had held a contempt hearing. (Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Aug. 31, 2015, R. 247.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A: Under the "duty'' analysis of Jeffs v. West, this Court should affirm the district
· court's dismissal of Mother's malpractice claim. First, this Court should apply a Jeffs duty
"categorization" that is consistent with the categorization originally presented by Mother,
which the district court accepted. That categorization limited the analysis to Therapist's
negligently-formulated opinion testimony, in the underlying custody litigation, that the
children had been abused by Mother. The Court should reject, as "invited error,"
Mother's effort to present a much broader categorization to this Court. Because Mother
seems to concede that the district court's decision was correct under the original
"negligent forensic opinion" categorization, this Cow1 may choose to summarily affirm
that decision. If not, then applying the five Jeffs "duty factors," weighed as befits the
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circumstances, this Court should conclude, like the district court, that Therapist owed no

duty to Mother.
B: If this Comt applies Mother's original "negligent forensic opinion"
categorization, it should disregard her grievances about Therapist's misconduct that falls

out~idc that categorization. If this Court does address those "col1atera1 mistakes," none of
them justifies imposing a duty upon Therapist lowar<l Mother. Pfrst, contrary to Mother's
argument, the law penuitted Therapi8t to serve as both a treating therapist and ac; a
witness at the custody trial. Next, Therapist's interference with Mother-Children visits,
and her improper acquisition of the children's care records, do not fall within any
reasonable definition of malpractice. Eavesdropping on the court-appointed evaluator, via
another therapy patient, also does not fall within malpractice, and any rights violated
thereby are not Mother's to asse1t. Finally, Mother's argwnent that Therapist behaved
"unethically," "tortiously," or "criminally," is unsupported by meaningful analysis; to the
extent that she expresses legitimate concerns, such concerns need not and should not be
deemed malpractice, and do not justify imposition of a malpractice duty toward Mother.

C: Although Mother asserts misapplication of the judicial proceeding privilege as
a separate and reversal-requiring error on appeal, neither the defense position nor the
district court's ruling turned on the piivilcge. Instead, the policies underlying the privilege
were presented within the framework of the Je/fs duty analysis. In her argument regarding
the privilege, Mother also improperly attempts to accuse Therapist of acting dishonestly
or otherwise in bad faith-an accusation absent from her Complaint and effectively
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disavowed by Mother in opposition to the motion to dismiss. She cannot present such
accusation, for the first time ever, to this Court.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT
DEFENDANT THERAPIST, AS AN ADVERSE TRIAL WITNESS,
OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF MOTHER.
A: CORRECT "NO DUTY" HOLDING UNDER JEFFS v. JVEST.
The district court decided Therapist's motion to dismiss under this Court's fivefactor analysis of when a duty exists, detailed in B.R. ex rel Jeffs v. TVest. 2012 UT 11.
275 P.3d 228. (District court Ruling, R. 286-292, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 4.)
Mother's claim was for health care malpractice, and failure of the "duty" element defeats
a malpractice claim. Id. ,i 5 & n.2. As follows, under a rational application of Jeffs,
adapted to this case, the district court's judgment should be affirmed.
Categorization under Jeffs v. West, and Invited Error.

In Jeffs, this Court identified five "duty factors" that must be "analyzed at a broad,
categorical level for a class of defendants~ ..." Scott v. Universal Sales, Inc, 2015 UT 64.

,i 29, 356 P.3d 1172 (quoting Jeffs). Jeffs arose from a tragedy wherein a husband, while
allegedly under the influence of improperly prescribed medications, murdered bis wife.
This Court held that the couple's surviving children were entitled to sue the prescriber for
the wife's death, because the prescriber owed a duty not only to the husband, but to the
children as well. The "category'' of defendants in Jeffs, for the purpose of assessing duty,
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was "healthcare providers as a class, negligent prescription of medication in general, and
the full range of injuries that could result in this class of cases." Jeffs. 2012 UT 11. ,r 23.
In this case, the district court defined the category as "a treating therapist who
testifies in 1itigation relying on their negligent formulation of forensic opinions ...." (R.
286, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum § 4.) To that categorization, and consistent with Jeffs,
the defense would appenu "and the range of iniuries that could result."
Mother now argues that the district court's categorization constituted "one initial,
overarching error [thc1t] l-<11nts t.he [district] c.owt's entire analysis of the duty owed ...."
(Appellant's Replacement. Rrief p. 16.) She now argues that the correct. categorization is:
"treating tl1erap1st5 who commit negligent acts during the performance of their services."
(Id. p. 20.) That category is dramatically broader than the one that Mother urged in the
district court: "[I]n this matter, the duty analysis considers treating therapists as a class,
negligent forensic determinations of sexual abuse of a minor, and the full range of injuries
that could result in the class of cases." (Mother's opp. to mot. to dismiss, R. 245, in
Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 3.) She offered this same categorization, verbatim, in her
brief to the Utah Court of Appeals. (Br. of Appellant p. 15, Court of Appeals No.
20160106-CA.) This "negligent forensic opinion" categorization is virtually the same as
the one that was adopted by the district court, quoted earlier.
Under its longstanding "invited error" doctrine, this Court should reject Mother's
new categorization of this case. This Court has explained: "Our invited error doctrine
arises from the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial
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when that paiiy led the trial court into committing the error." Pratt v. Nelson. 2007 UT
41. ,r 17. 164 P .3d 366 (quoting authority). "Invited error" is not limited to errors "at
trial;" for example, in Pratt, the doctrine was considered in the context of summary
judgment proceedings. Id.

,r~ 8-10. 17-24. Indeed, invited error should be more strongly

condemned in the context of written motion practice, in which the parties have more time,
than would be available at trial, to consider, research, and hrief their positions.
So it. was in this case. In Therapist's motion to dismiss, the defense initially argued
that Jeffs does not apply. (R. 142-143.) In opposition, Mother insisted thatJ~ffe does
apply, and presented her "negligent forensic opinion" categorization. (R. 245, in
Appellee~s Repl. Addendum§ 3.) Tn reply, the defense briefed the motion ooder Jeffs, and
offered a modified version of Mother's categorization: "This case may be better
categ9rized to involve health care professionals who testify in litigation, negligent
fonnulation of forensic opinions, and the injuries that could result." (R. 269.)

It is pretty clear that Moth~r's eleventh-hour attempt to vastly broaden her case
categorization is an effort to emphasize alleged (and presumed true) conduct of Therapist
that falls outside Mother's original "negligent forensic opinion" categorization. In the
defense briefing to the district court, as well as our brief to the court of appeals, we
described that conduct as collateral (and hence irrelevant) to "duty'' analysis ooder Jeffs.
(Defense reply mem., R. 272-273; Br. of Appellee p. 24-25, Utah Court of Appeals No.
20160106-CA.) That conduct included Therapist's defiance of custody court orders,
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improperly retrieving records from her former office, and her effort to eavesdrop on the
court-appointed evaluator. (Fact ilil 7-d, 9-a, 9-c, 9-d, supra p. 7-8.)
The defense understands that this Court is likely to disapprove of that conduct. Our
best explanation is that it was driven (like her deficient forensic opinion) by Therapist's

inexperience and her lack of legal couw~.1 to guide her. (Tr. argument on mot. to dismiss

pp. 11, 27-28, at R. 330., 346-347, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 5.) But when Mother
presented her unegligent forensic opinion" categorization to the district court, for
purposes of "duty" analysis, she effectively invited the court to disregard Therapist's
collateral misconduct. While the district court did not ignore that conduct, its ruling did

focus, consistently with Mother's case categorization, upon Therapist's flawed opinion
testimony. (R. 284-294, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum § 4.)
"Invited error" doctrine discourages litigants from affirmatively misleading trial
courts, and "fortifies [this Court's] long-established policy that the trial court should have
the first opportunity to address a claim of error." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ,i 17 (quoting

authority),jollowed and quoted in Wilson v. JHC Hospitals, Inc., 2012 UT 43~ ,i 72, 289
P .3d 369. Mother now assails, as "overarching error," the district court's adoption of the
very case categorization that she herself advocated. Based upon invited error, that
argument is barred. See Pratt, ,r 16 (invited error bars even "plain error'' appellate review,
which can apply to issues that were merely overlooked in the trial court).
Therefore, this Court should categorize this case similarly to the district court, for
purposes of "duty" analysis under Jeffs. The defense proposes this version of the district
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court's categorization: Treating health care providers who testify in litigation relying on
their negligent fonnulation of forensic opinions, and the range of injuries that could
result. Under Jeffs. 2012 UT 1 L ~~ 23, 27, this seems to be suitably clear, general, and
broad, yet not so broad and vague as to be unworkable.
Remarkably, in her brief to this Court, Mother appears to concede that under her
original "negligent forensic opinion" categorization, the district court's decision was
correct: "Mother does not disagree with the IdistJ.ict! court's ruling under the law as it
now exists, as it applies to the therapist's testimonv-both the rule of law and the policy
behind the rule are fairly stated." (Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 30, italics in original,
underscore added.) If Mother is held to that concession, and if "invited error" bars her
effort to change her case categorization, then it appears within this Court's prerogative
and discretion to summarily affirm the district court judgment.
The defense would welcome such result. Nevertheless, in the balance of this
section A, we apply Jeffs under the district court's "negligent forensic opinion"
categorization. In section B-although it should not be necessary-we revisit Therapist's
collateral misconduct, explaining why it fails to support imposition of a duty, upon
Therapist, toward Mother. In section C, we address the ''judicial proceeding privilege,"
which Mother incorrectly raises as a separate issue on appeal.

The Five Jeffs "Duty Factors."
The five Jeffs "duty factors" are: (1) whether the defendant's alleged errors consist
of affirmative acts or mere omissions; (2) the legal relationship of the parties; (3) the
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foreseeability or likelihood of injury; ( 4) public policy as to which party can best bear
(prevent) the loss occac;ioned by the injury; and (5) "other general policy considerations."
The first two factors are generally deemed "plus" factors to hold that a duty exists, while
the last three are "minus" factors. "Not every factor is created equal," such that "some
factors are featured heavily in certain types of cases, while other factors play a less
important, or different, role." Jeffs. 2012 UT 11, ~ 5.
On appeal, the defense "Jeffs duty factor" analysis varies a bit from that of the
district court. This variance is permissible, because this Court can affirm the district
cowt's decision on any proper alternative ground. E.g., Moss v. Parr ·waddoups Brm1,'n

Gee & Loveless. 2012 UT 42, iJ 26, 285 P.3d 1157; State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah
1996). Also, Jeffs arose from a murder; this case arises from contentious underlying
litigation. The variances urged by the defense relate to this distinction.

Jeffs Factor 1: Affirmative Acts versus Omissions.
The first Jeffs duty factor does not bear the weight that Mother places upon it. As
evidenced by the case categorization, Mother's grievance is that Therapist negligently
formed and testified to her opinion that Mother had abused her children. In the distdct
court, Mother described that error as "affirmative misconduct." {Opp. to mot. to dismiss,
R. 242-243, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum § 3.) "Affirmative misconduct" would
generally be a Jeffs "plus factor'' for holding that Therapist owed a duty to Mother.
However, "almost every instance," and thus not every instance, of affirmative
conduct gives rise to a duty. Jeffs, 2012 UT 11. ,i 9 ( quoting authority, emphasis added).
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Also, "[t]he line between acts and omissions is sometimes subtle." Scott v. Universal
Sales, 2015 UT 64,, 35. 2 In describing Thernpist's error as "affirmative misconduct,"

Mother omits one ofber key criticisms: that Therapist "uncritically accepted"
Stepmother's statements that the children had been abused, without reco&rnizing that such
statements were heavily influenced by Father and Stepmot.her;s position in the custody
dispute. (Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 9 ii 6.)
That criticism was a key component of Therapist's alleged malpractice: Because
Therapist omitted, or failed to perform, critical examination of Stepmother's statements,
her expert opinion in the child custody dispute was flawed (and therefore failed). That
omission is a "minus" factor under Jeffs-or at least a feature to be subtracted from the

"plus" nature of the first Jeffs factor.
Even if Therapist, s "negligent forensic opinion" error is deemed an entirely "plus"
factor for imposing a duty, it is not on the magnitude of prescribing drugs that could
cause a patient to physically injure others, as alleged in Jeffs. Therapist did nothing that
could have caused the children to physically hann Mother. She created no risk that the
children would be effectively orphaned, as happened in Jeffs. Instead, Therapist testified
at the custody trial against Mother, giving an opinion that was flawed and non-credible.

2In

Scott, the "affirmative act" was establishing a work-release program for jail inmates.
2016 UT 64, ii 34. However, there was a tragic "omission" in Scott, consisting of failure
to adequately supervise those inmates; one such inmate assaulted the plaintiff. Id. ,r 9.
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Furthermore, Therapist had a legislatively-mandated "affirmative duty." While
treating the children, if she had "reason to believe" that they were being abused, Therapist
wa-=; obliged to report such belief to law enforcement. Failure to report could be a crime.
Utah Code Ann.§§ 62A-4a-403, 62A-4a-411 (Westlaw 2017). By communicating her
opinion to the custody court, Therapist acted consistently with Utah law. It would be
unfair to expose Therapist to criminal liability for an omission in failing to report
Vi)

suspected abuse, yet subject her to civil liability for making a report that turns out to be
mistaken. This also weakens the "affinuativc acts" factor in this case. In sum, Therapist's

faulty opinion testimony is, at most, a very weak "plmt' factor.
.Teffs Factor 2: Legal Relationship of the Parties.

In Jejjs, no LLspecial legal relationship," between the prescriber and the non-patient
plaintiffs, was needed to hold that the prescriber owed a duty toward the plaintiff". This
Court explained that this factor "generally" applies only when negligent omissions or
~

"failures to act" are alleged. 2012 UT 11, ~ 7. Because the prescribing decisions in Jeffs
were affirmative acts, the "legal relationship" factor did not apply. Id. 17-15.
In this case, the district court similarly held that because Mother did not allege
omissions as the basis for her malpractice claim, "this element requires no further
evaluation at this time." (R. 289, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum § 4.) The defense
respectfully disagrees. This case presents an instance wherein the general rule does not
apply, and the "legal relationship" factor is of major concern.

21
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

That legal relationship was adversarial, because Therapist was a witness for
Mother's adversaries in the underlying custody dispute-. H beggars belief t.n suggest that as
an adverse witness, Therapist owed to Mother a duty of care that could support a
malpractice claim. When the children were her patients, Therapist had a duty to treat them
within care standards. Maybe 8he had a duty toward Father a11d Stepmother, who called
her as their custody trial witness. Cf 1'1arrogi v. Howard, 805 So.2d 1118 (La. 2002)
(permitting the party who retained au expert to sue him, after his defective opinion caused
that party to lose the underlying case) (cited in Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 42). But
she certainly had no duty to give opinions in support of Mother. If Therapisf s opinion
was negligently formulated, Mother's remedy was to counter it in the custody courtwhich she did successfully. (Tr. argument on mot. to dismiss, p. 11-12 at R. 330-331, p.
29-30 at R. 348-349, in Addendum§ 5.) See f_qrker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496,499 (Utah
1998) (remedy against errant court-appointed expert was not a civil claim, but rather,
cross-examination and presentation of an opposing expert).
Apparently comprehending that Therapist's erroneous opinion might be deemed an
omission rather than affirmative misconduct, Mother argues that Therapist had a "special
relationship" with her, because Therapist "was treating Mother's minor children with full
knowledge of the allegations a.ga.1nst her." Mother then segues into a recitation of the
constitutional dimension of parental rights. (Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 23-24.)
Mother overlooks that Pather had an equally powerful constitutional interest in the
children, and thus

a11

equally compelling "special relationship" with Therapist. Given the
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parents' competing constitutional interests, the custody court applied the "clear and

~

convincing" proof standard at the custody trial. (R. 211

,r 185-186, in Appellee's Repl.

Addendum § 1.) In short, the custody court accounted for constitutional concerns.
Also, Mother overlooks the children

whose best interest') were the proper center

of Therapist's and the custody court's attention. Therapist's relationship with Mother was
no more "special" than her relationships with Father and the children. It cannot impose a
duty upon Therapist, toward Mother, for purposes of malpractice.
Again, the key "special" feature about the legal relationship was its adversarial
nature. Under thoughtful application of Jeffs duty analysis, this feature has to be
considered. Although disregarded by the district court, and identified in Jeffs as a "plus"
factor, 2012 UT 11, ,r 5, this feature has to be a "minus" factor in this case. It is hard to
imagine that it could even be neutral.

Jeffs Factor 3: Foreseeability or Likelihood ofInjury.
No doubt, it is foreseeable that when a witness testifies in favor of one party to a
lawsuit, her testimony, if believed, will "injure" the adverse party. No doubt, when Father
~

and Stepmother called Therapist as one of their custody trial witnesses, they intended to
injure Mother's position on child custody. The district court aptly observed: "That is the
inherent nature and intent of our adversarial court system." (R. 290, in Appellee's Repl.
Addendwu § 4.) As it turned out, the custody court dashed Father's and Stepmother's
intentions, because it did not believe Therapist's testimony.
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In her argument on foreseeability, Mother cites a psychology abstract, entitled
"The Treating Expe1i: A Hybrid Role with Pinn Boundaries," by L. Greenberg, Ph.D. and

.T. C.nuld, Ph.D. (2001) (hereinafter "Greenberg-Gould article"). (Appellant'\;
Replacement Br. p. 25-26; the artide is <;opit;d in Appellant's Addendum E.) The
Greenberg-Gould article cautions dril<l U1t;rapists a.gainst the "uncritical acceptance." or
statements made by individuals who ate involved in Hlligh-conflicC cuslotly disputes. As
such, the article provides worthwhile advice to care providers, such as Therapist, who
find themselves caught in such "tribal warfare." 3

In litigation, it is both foreseeable and expected that the credibility of any witness
will be challenged for foundation, for bias, and for any and all other reasons pennitted
under evidentiary rules. It is both foreseeable and expected that in a contest of competing
witnesses, the fact finder will decide which are more credible, and one side or the other
will come away disappointed and defeated. This is normal under "the inherent nature and
intent of our adversarial court system," to borrow the district court's expression. The
Greenberg-Gould article changes that not one iota.
Had she received and taken Greenberg and Gould's advice to heart, perhaps
Therapist's custody trial testimony would have been more credible. With ironic candor,
Mother aclmowledges-not once, but twice-that Therapist's testimony in the custody
court "was in fact helpful to Mother." It "was so biased and flawed that it was helpful to

3Or,

as defense counsel put it in arguing the motion to dismiss, "a poop storm." (Tr.
argument on mot. to dismiss, p. 29-30, R. 348-349, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 5.)
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Mother." (Appellant's Replacement Br. pp. 28, 39.) So while hann was foreseeable from
Therapist's faulty testimony, the intended and dire harm at issue-loss of parental
rights

did not occur. Tn sum, this "foreseeability" fot:lor cannot suppo1t imposition of a

duty, upon Therapist, to Mother. To the contrary, given Therapist's "adverse witness"
role, this is a powerful "minus" factor under .hf{._<;,

Jeffs Factor 4: Public Policy about Jf7fto Should Bear (can prevent) the Loss.
The fourth Jeffs factor "considers whether the defendant is best situated to take
reasonable precautions to avoid injury." Jeffs, 2012 UT 11, -if 30. The district court

observed that because child custody decisions utilize information from multiple sources,
it would be unfair to impose a duty on one witness, as attempted by Mother:
There are many people and institutions involved in custody
determinations. Orders to keep a parent away from her children, include
information provided by other parents, other witnesses, other therapists,
departments of the State such as the Department [sic] of Child and Family
Services. Ultimately, whether an order is issued is determined by the Court.
Since a health care provider who testifies is not the sole, or direct cause of a
court's order, it would be impossible for her to prevent the harm on her
own. The person who is best situated to avoid the injury is the person or
agency who orders the separation of Plaintiff from her children, based upon
the totality of the information provided.... It would be inappropriate to
place the full burden of blame for separation of parent and child upon the
shoulders of one witness, even if it is alleged that the witness negligently
formulated forensic opinions.
(Ruling on Mot. to Dismiss, R. 291-292, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 4.)
That observation was astute and accurate. The long custody dispute, underlying
Mother's district court lawsuit, did not turn just upon Therapist's testimony. Instead, it
featured multiple investigations by the Utah Division of Child and Family Services. The
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Utah Attorney General's office was involved. Psychosexual and polygraph examinations
were done. A court-appointed examiner testified at the trial. "ACAFS" submitted child
visitation reports. At least two other involved therapists testified, hesides defendant
Therapist. A children's shelter nurse also testified. (Fact ,r 11, supra p. 8-9.) It took six
months to try the custody dispute, and another seven months for the custody cowt to issue
its decision. (Fact, 10-13, supra p. 8-9.)
As it happened, Mother's position was vindicated, in part because of the very
"negligence" that she attributes to Therapist. (This was not the first time, nor will it be the
last time, that a trial witness has been found non-credible.) The custody court also
lambasted and sought to punish Father and Stepmother for their misconduct during the
custody litigation. (Fact, 16-18, supra p. 10-11.) Thus while the custody court criticized
Therapist, it identified Father and Stepmother as the major culprits.
As the named litigants, assisted by counsel, Father and Stepmother were better
situated than Therapist to avoid Mother's alleged injury-which evidently consists of the
expense and angst of successfully opposing Therapist's opinion. Of course, as already
observed, Father and Stepmother set out to cause a much more dire injury to Mother-the
deprivation of her parental rights. Had they and their counsel done a better job of
preparing Therapist for her custody trial testimony, or had they utilized a more competent
expert, Mother could have lost those rights. After all, at least three prior abuse allegations
against Mother had been investigated and found to be supported. (Fact ,I 3, supra p. 5.)

26
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mother asserts that Therapist "was neither qualified nor authorized" to give
(i;

forensic opinion testimony. (Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 16.) If that were so, then she
and her counsel should have moved to exclude Therapist from testifying, under Utah R.
Evid. 702 and related case law. Of course, it turned out to be strategically astute to pennit
Therapist to testify, and to so thoroughly impeach her that her testimony actually helped
Mother. In either event, Mother and her counsel were better situated, than Therapist, to
prevent the "injury'' foreseen by Therapist's testimony.
Even the very existence of "injury'' is in question. Having prevailed in the custody
trial, Mother's only tangible harm is that she had to pay her counsel to defeat the abuse
allegations. The custody court ordered Father and Stepmother to pay Mother's attorney
fees and costs, in rare exception to the normal American rule that each side in litigation
pays its own attorney fees. E.g., Utahns

for Better Dental Health v. Davis Co. Clerk, 2007

.

UT 97, ~ 5. 175 P.3d 1036. They were to pay those fees and costs in order to avoid jail on
the custody court's contempt finding. (Fact if 18e-f, supra p. 11.) Mother does not say
whether she had a hearing on the contempt finding, nor does she say why she could not
I@

collect the fees and costs. In any event, Therapist cannot be obliged to correct Mother's
default on that issue, nor to indemnify Father and Stepmother for that award.
As to the angst of litigation, Mother offers no authority to suggest that such
emotional distress is independently compensable. Trials are stressful-another inherent
feature of our adversarial justice system. Overall, then, the "bear (prevent) the loss"
factor, a "minus" factor under Jeffs, is a "strong minus" in this case.
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Jeffs Factor 5: Other General Policy Considerations.
lnto this factor, the defense incorporates policies that underpin the judicial
proceeding privilege. The district court similarly considered such policies, finding potent
reasons against imposing a duty upon Therapist toward Mother. (R. 289-291, in
Appellcc's Repl. Addendum§ 4.) Again, Mother,s alleged harm arose from Therapist's
opinion testimony. That testimony-whether or not well-founded

is protected by the

judicial proceeding privilege:
A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning
another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or
as part of a judicial proceeding in which he [or she] is to testify, jf it has
some relation to the proceeding.
RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS§ 588,

quoted and followed in Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d

1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). "The policy behind such privilege is to encourage full and
candid participation in judicial proceedings by shielding the participant from potential
liability for defamation." Price, 949 P.2d at 1256. The privilege bars all civil liability
arising from participation in judicial proceedings, not limited to defamation:
"Participation in a judicial proceeding will be inhibited unless all claims arising from the
same statements are protected." Id. at 1258.
The judicial proceeding privilege has three elements: (1) The statements must be
made during or in the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) they must have some reference
to the subject matter of the proceeding; and (3) the statements must have been made by
someone acting in the capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel. Price, 949
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P.2d at 1256. The first two elements are broadly interpreted, while the third is "relatively
straightf01ward." Pratt v. NelsonL2007__UT 41, ,r 29-31. They are undeniably established
in this case: (1) Therapist's opinion was given during and in the course of the underlying

child custody litigation; (2) her opinion related to the litigation; and (3) she was acting as
a witness in that litigation.
As Mother observes (Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 34-35), the privilege is
limited: the statement(s) must not be "excessively published." See Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ii
33-39. In Pratt, some litigants lost the judicial proceeding privilege by airing their civil
complaint in a public press conference. Id.~ 48. In this case, that limitation was not
transgressed: Mother does nut allege that Therapist publicly aired her faulty opinion.
In Moss v. Parr Waddoups, 2012 UT 24, this Court examined the judicial
proceeding privilege with respect to attorneys. The Cowt construed the privilege to
immunize not merely statements, but also the conduct of attorneys on behalf of their
clients. In Moss, that conduct consisted of obtaining and executing an ex parte order to
conduct immediate discovery-akin to a search warrant for a civil case. 2012 UT 24,, 5-

.2.. This Court approved a Texas court's observation:
If an attorney could be held liable to an opposing party for statements made
or actions taken in the course of representing his client, he would be forced
constantly to balance his own potential exposure against his client's best
interest.
2012 UT 24, ,r 33, quoting Alpert v. Crain, Caton & James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398,405
~

(Tex.App.2005). Moss thereby refutes Mother's assertion that privilege "only applies to
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the testimony of a witness in court." (Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 19.)

A1oss anti the Texas court addressed the judicial proceeding privilege with respect
to attorneys. It similarly would be poor policy to force Therapist to balance. potential civil
liability against her duty to testify lruthfully (even if mistakenly) in the child custody
court, and to act in ways that she deemed hdpful (even if mistakenly) to her patient
children's best interests. If attorneys are immunized for their statements and actions in
connection with litigation, then persons such as Therapist, lacking equivalent legal
expertise, should receive at least equivalent protection.
The judicial proceeding privilege may, by itself, bar Mother's malpractice lawsuit
against Therapist-even if she otherwise owed a duty to Mother. 4 Regardless, the policy
supporting this privilege constitutes an exceptionally potent consideration and "minus"
factor, under Jeffs, regarding duty to Mother.
The related principle of "quasi-judicial immunity" also weighs against imposing a
duty. In Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, 250 P .3d 465, the Utah
Supreme Court applied quasi-judicial immunity to a government attorney and to a
physician who were involved in litigation about whether a child should receive cancer
treatment over his parents' objections. The attorney had participated in decisions leading
to the criminal arrest of the child's father, and had allegedly "performed a skewed

4

For example, in Scott v. Universal Sales, this Court held that the defendants owed a duty
to prevent work-release inmates from harming innocent citizens. The defendants breached
that duty, but were protected by governmental immunity (which differs from the judicial
proceeding privilege). 2015 UT 64, ,r,r 34-50, 62-67.
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investigation" about whether the parents' refusal of conventional treatment constituted
neglect. 2011 UT 17, ii 54. The physician had testified that an alternative treatment
provider, preferred by the parents, was not qualified. Id.~ 27-28. This Court affirmed

'i

summary dismissal of the parents' claims against the attorney and physician. Id.

,r 52-56.

The attorney and physician were owed quasi-judicial immunity, the Court held, because
they had "played an integral part in the judicial process." Id. ,i 104.

In this case, Therapist similarly played an integral (although hardly exclusive) part
in the underlying child custody litigation. Assuming that she contributed to some
disruption of Mother's relationship with the chikfren, her role does not seem a~ seriou~ as
causing a criminal arrest-an action that wc1s immunized in J~nsen. And providing trial
~

opinions adverse to one side also was immunized in Jensen. Therefore, like the accused
individuals in Jensen, Therapist may be entitled to qua~i-judicial i111111w1ity. At least, the
policy supporting such immunity is a potent "minus" policy factor under Jeffs. 5
Mother has never accused Therapist of giving intentionally false testimony, but
even perjurers are generally immune from subsequent civil lawsuits. In Briscoe v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325 0983), the United States Supreme Court upheld common law immunity for
police officers who had allegedly given perjured testimony at criminal trials, resulting in

5

Jensen seems to fit better within the judicial proceeding privilege than quasi-judicial

immunity, because the attorney and physician were adverse to plaintiffs in the underlying
litigation, and do not appear to have been court-appointed. This Court has elsewhere
stated that quasi-judicial immunity protects persons who are court-appointed to exercise
"discretionary judgment" that is "functionally comparable to that of a judge." Parker v.
Dodgion~ 971 P .2d 496, 498 {Utah 1998). This Court may wish to clarify Jensen.
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guilty verdicts. The officers' function was to testify in aid of the truth finding process.
Even though they subverted that function by committing perjury, immunity applied.
Quoting Judge Learned Hand, the Supreme Court explained: "In this instance it has been
thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than
to subject those who try to do right to the constant dread of retaliation." 460 U.S. at 345,
quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). Of course, in this case,
Therapist's negligently-formulated opinion has not gone unredressed. Her opinion was
resoundingly rejected by the custody court, and Mother prevailed in the custody trial.
Consistent with the just-cited authority, the district court correctly endorsed Utah's
strong policy in favor of protecting litigation witnesses:
It is crucial for witnesses to give full and candid testimony during judicial
proceedings. While the [custody court] found [Therapist]'s testimony to be
flawed, biased, and incorrect, it was her sworn testimony. Establishing a
duty for all treating therapists to provide only testimony that is perceived to
be based on non-negligently formulated forensic opinions is not reasonable.
(R. 290, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum § 4.)
Another important policy is that litigation must eventually become final. Having
successfully discredited Therapist's testimony in the custody trial, Mother should not be
pennitted to proceed as a "sore winner" in this spinoff litigation. If prevailing parties in
trials are permitted to sue their opposing witnesses in retaliation, the result will be
[
\¢ii,

metastatic litigation, as one lawsuit spawns another, and so on. Judicial resources should
be preserved for other litigants, who need and deserve their own days in court.
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In sum, there are especially powerful reasons, under this final Jeffs "other policies"
factor" that weigh against imposing a duty upon Therapist toward Mother. Under a
rational consideration of this factor, along with the other four Jejjj• factors, this Court
should affirm the district court's holding that Therapist owed no duty to Mother, and
affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal.
B: NO DUTY CREATED BY THERAPIST'S COLLATERAL MISTAKES.

So far, the defense hac;; focused upon Therapist's role as a witness in the widerlying
child custody dispute. As explained earlier, this is becam,e Mother originally defined this
case to be a.bout Therapist's Hnegligent forensic opinion." As also explained earlier,
"invited error" should bar Mother from changing this case categorization.
If this Court agrees that invited error doctrine holds Mother to her original

"negligent forensic opinion" categorization, then it should agree that Therapist's other
alleged mistakes fall outside this category, and are not relevant to "duty'' analysis under
Jeff.r.; v. West. In the defense brief to the court of appeals, we took that position, and

described those mistakes as "collateral errors." (Br. of Appellee p. 24-25, Utah Court of
Appeals No. 20160106-CA.) In case this Court views tllings dillerently, we now address
those other mistakes, describing them, for brevity, as "cullatera.1 mistakes."
A close reading of Mother's Replacement Brief discloses the following alleged
co11ateral mistakes: (1) Therapist "acted as a forensic therapist when she was neither
qualified nor authorized to do so," which overlaps an allegation that she "exceeded the
bounds of her responsibilities as a therapist;" (2) Therapist opposed, and interfered with,
33
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contact between Mother and the children; (3) Therapist improperly took the children's
care records from her former office and released them to the custody court, the parties,
and their attorneys; (4) Therapist engaged an unrelated therapy patient to surreptitiously
dectronically record the comi-appointed custody evaluator; (5) Therapist "violated her
ethical obligations;" (6) Therapist "engaged in tortious, and possibly criminal acts ...."
(Appellant's Replacement Br. pp. 16, 22, 27.) Whe.Lher considered collectively or
individually, these collateral mistakes give rise to no malpractice duty toward Mother.
Collective Consideration of Therapist's Collateral Mb,takes.
Collectively, those mistakes have no more than an extremely tenuous relationship
to Therapist's actual treatment of the children. Mother has never alleged that Therapist
did anything that directly harmed the children. This distinguishes this case from Jeffs v.

West, wherein the defendant prescriber harmed the patient by causing him to experience
murderous rage. In this case, Therapist did no such thing.
The custody court was evidently outraged by Therapist's collateral mistakes,
stating: "Due to [Therapist]'s egregious and unprofessional misconduct, as well as her
obvious bias, any opinions she offered to this Court are deemed utterly unreliable."
(Custody decision ,r 67, R. 172, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.) Even if Therapist's
mistakes were both wrong and criminal, they did not reflect truthfulness, and should not
have been used as credibility evidence. Utah R. Evid. 608, 609. It was sufficient for the
custody court to reject Therapist's opinion based upon her flawed assessment of limited
information, and based upon the bias that arose from that flawed assessment. Therapist's
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collateral mistakes, misused by the custody court, do not justify imposing a duty to
Mother, a non-patient, for purposes of malpractice.
Mother sued Therapist under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (UHCMA).
(Complaint 1 5, R. 2, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 2.) The UHCMA defines "health
care" as follows:
"Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished, or which
should have been performed or furnished, by any health care provider for,
to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment, or
confinement.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-403(10) (Westlaw 2017). This statutory definition is not
endlessly elastic. In Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, 94 P .3d 915, this Court held that the
definition did not include a therapist's seduction of her patient, and did not bar an
"alienation of affections" claim by the patient's wife against the therapist.
In this case, many of Therapist's collateral mistakes, which include "exceeding the
bounds of her responsibilities" and "advocating" certain positions based upon her poorlyformulated abuse opinion, exceed any reasonable boundary of"health care." Indeed, in
her briefing to the court of appeals, Mother equated one such mistake-retrieving records
from Therapist's former office-with different torts:
For example, if an individual broke into another's home, stole numerous
items of personal property and later testified in court, he should not be
immune from suit for conversion, trespass, or other offenses.
~

(Appellant's Reply Br. p. 5, Utah Court of Appeals No. 20160106-CA.) If Mother wanted
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to sue Therapist "for conversion, trespass, or other offenses,,, she should have done so in
her Complaint. She did not. Nor did she move to amend her Complaint, to add any such
claims or others, when faced with the defense motion to dismiss. Neither the definition of
"health care" nor the assessment of duty should be distorted to create a duty based upon
Thcrapist"s collateral mistakes.
lridividual Cmi.~ideration of Tlwrupist 's Collateral Afistakes.

Considered individually, Therapist's collateral mistakes also do not justify
imposing a duty toward Mother. The defense responds in the listed order.
(1): A Treating Care Provider Can Testify as an Expert.

Without analysis or citation to authority, Mother argues that Therapist "was neither
qualified nor authorized" to serve both as the children's therapist and as an expert in the
custody litigation. Actually, the law permits a treating health care provider to give
forensic opinion testimony, subject to pretrial disclosure and the usual standards for
foundation. Drev., v. Lee, 2011 UT 15, ~ 29_ 250 P.3d 48; Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT
App 305, ,i 11-15_ 141 P.3d 629. Without the patient's consent, a care provider cannot
testify as an expert against his or her patient. Sorensen v. Barbuto_ 2008 UT 8, 177 P.3d
614. In this case, there is no inkling that Therapist acted against what she perceived
(mistakenly or not) to be the interests of her patients, the children.
As for Therapist's foundational qualification to testify, as explained earlier,

Mother evidently made no such challenge in the custody court. Instead, her counsel let
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Therapist testify at trial, and successfully attacked her credibility. Because she asserts that
Therapist's testimony actually helped her (supra p. 24), Mother appears ill-positioned to
complain of it nm:v.
Mother's assertion that Therapist was not "authorized" to testify as an expert is
also unexplained and also fails. Father and Stepmother called Therapist into the custody
court as one of their witnesses. Whatever further "authority"' was required, Mother does
not explain. This is a classic instance of inadequate appellate briefing. Neither this Court
nor the defense need provide such explanation for her. See, e.g., MacKay v. Hardv, 973
P.2d 941, 947-948 & n.9 (Utah 1998).
Mother repeatedly incants, in varying terms, that Therapist "exceeded the bounds
ii,

of her responsibilities as a therapist." 6 The misguided source of that mantra appears to be
the Greenberg-Gould article, discussed earlier. The custody court accepted the
Greenberg-Gould article "as a learned treatise." (Custody decision 152, R. 167, in
Appellee's Repl. Addendwn § 1.) It apparently did so as an exception to the hearsay
prohibition, under Utah R. Evid. 803(18).

6E.g.,

Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 13 (Therapist improperly acted as "accuser"); p. 22
(Therapist opined that the children had been abused, "[d]espite it being beyond her role as
a treating therapist"); p. 27 {Therapist "exceeded her role as a treating therapist and
improperly made a forensic detemunation that the minor children were sexually abused
by Mother"); p. 28 (Therapist acted "outside her role as a therapist"); p. 33 (Therapist
acted "outside the scope of the legitimate role of the testifying therapist"); p. 39-40
(Therapist "was precluded from having any kind of dual role as both treating therapist and
forensic therapist").
37
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The Greenberg-Gould article warns about "dual role" pitfalls of serving both as
therapist and expert witness in child custody disputes. The authors describe the differing
"focus" of a treating psychologist, as opposed to that of a child custody evaluator, and
then state: ''It is therefore not appropriate for treating therapists to render opinions on
psycholegal issues (parental capadly, child custody, validity of an abuse allegation, etc.)
that are the province of the child custody evaluator and ultimately the Court." (GrccnbcrgGould article p. 12, in Appellant's Addendum E.)
Greenberg and Gould are entitled to that opinion, but it does not state the law on
this point. Besides permitting care providers to testify as experts in support of their
patients, Utah law states: "An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an
ultimate issue." Utah R. Evid. 704{a); Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ~ 34 n. 12, 29 P.3d
638 (experts may testify as to ultin1ate opinion) (quoting and citing authority). So the law
permitted Therapist to opine, to the custody court, that the children had been abused by
Mother. That opinion was found to be deficient, to Mother's benefit.
Nor can it be concluded that the Greenberg-Gould article establishes a standard of
care for Therapist, as Mother seems to presume-again with zero authority or analysis.
(Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 39.) Greenberg and Gould appear to be forensic
psychologists (Appellant's Addendum E, p. 1.) It is far from clear that their opinion about
"dual role" psychologists purports to set care standards; presumably, the forensic
psychologist profession has its own set of actual standards. Therapist is a social worker;
presumably, that profession has its own standards. Mother offers, to this Court, zero
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explanation about whether these different professions have identical or overlapping care
Cii>

standards that would support her malpractice claim.
The custody court was persuaded, in part, by the Greenberg-Gould article, and in
part by live testimony, that Therapist's opinion was improperly fommlated and noncredible. That was the custody court's prerogative. But rejecting an opinion as noncredible cannot and should not be taken to mean, after the fact, that the opinion should
never have been given in the first place. Nor can it support, after the fact, the imposition
of a duty, by the errant witness, toward an opposing party.
Mother's "exceeded the bounds" mantra is of a piece with another oft-repeated
assertion: that Therapist improperly acted as an "advocate" in the custody dispute.
(Appellant's Replacement Br. pp. 7, 9 ~ 9, 14, 22, 27, 39.) It does not appear that either
the custody court, any legal authority offered by Mother, or the two scholarly articles in
Mother's Addenda utilized this term or addressed what it means for a witness to act as an
"advocate." If Therapist acted as an "advocate," it was as an advocate for the children.
Given that Therapist believed, albeit mistakenly, that the children had been abused
by Mother, it is hardly surprising that she would "advocate" to restrict Mother's contact
with them. It is probable that Therapist's misplaced "advocacy" appeared, to the custody
court, to give rise to bias against Mother. Bias, of course, was one of the custody court's
legitimate reasons to discredit Therapist's testimony. But bias-an affliction from which
nobody is immune-does not justify the imposition of a duty, upon the losing "advocate,"
to the winning party. Advocacy, like bias, is an inescapable feature of litigation.
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(2): Interfering with Mother-Children Contact.

The custody court found that Therapist openly opposed a court-appointed

evaluator's observation of Mother's interactions with the children. (Custody decision ,r
59-61, R. 169-170, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.) The custody court's remedy was
to remove Therapist as the children's therapist, to appoint a new therapist for them, and to
bar further contact between Therapist and the children. (Custody decision ,r 61, R. 170.)
Unquestionahly, it is a serious mistake to defy a cuurl order, and Therapist
compounded the just-identified collateral mistake by either re-l;uulacting the children or
by attempting to observe a supervised Mother-children visit, at Stepmother's request,
after the custody court banished her. (Fact ,r 9-a, supra p. 7.) For that misconduct, it
would not have been surprising for the custody court to find Therapist in contempt, and to
punish her, under Utah Code Ann.§§ 78B-6-302, -303, -310 (Westlaw 2017).
The custody court did not do so, and it does not appear proper now, long after the
fact, to incorporate that misbehavior into a malpractice clain1. At the time, the children
were no longer Therapist's patients, which should remove that misbehavior from the
purview of health care malpractice. Therefore, this collateral mistake should not give rise
to a duty owed to Mother, for purposes of her malpractice claim.
(3): Unauthorized Retrieval and Release lf Care Records.

The next collateral mistake is Therapist's retrieval of the children's care records,
described by the custody court as "HIPPA [sic: HIP AA]-protected." She used someone
else's key to enter her former office, obtained the records, and distributed them to the
40
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

custody dispute parties, attorneys, and court. (Fact, 9d-e, supra p. 8.) The custody court
viewed that misbehavior as "a serious violation of thc children's privacy rights and highly
unethical.'' (Custody decision ii 66, R. 172, in Appdlee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.)
Mother offers no legal support for her apparent conclusion that Therapist violated

HIP AA, the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, when she
obtained and distributed those records. Nor did the custody court reach such conclusion,
beyond its bare assertion that the records were "protected" by HIPAA. But even if such
violation occurred, HIPAA creates no private right of action. Espino~q v. Gold Cross

Services. Inc... 2010 UT App 151., 8. 234 P.3d 156.
Furthermore, assuming that Therapist improperly obtained the children's care
records from her former office, the custody court found she distributed them only within
the confines of the custody litigation-to the court, the parties, anu t;Owisel. (Fact 19d-e,

supra p. 8.) On appeal, Mother does not suggest otherwise. Hence, those private records
were not excessively distributed, which minimizes the impact of this mistake.
Finally, whether ''unethical" or otherwise improper, Therapist's handling of those
records did not violate Mother's rights. The children's privacy rights, according to the
custody court, were violated. Mother has never purported to bring her malpractice claim
on behalf of the children. She named herself as plaintiff, in her own tight, without
asserting that she was acting on the children's behalf. (Complaint, in Appellee's Repl.
Addendum§ 2.) Overall, there is no rational or just basis to bootstrap Therapist's
mistake, regarding the children's records, into a malpractice claim to benefit Mother.
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(4): Eavesdropping on the Court-Appointed Evaluator.

It was wrong for Therapist to recruit her unrelated patient to electronically record
the court-appointed custody evaluator. But that ~avesdropping was not a mistreatment. of
the children, nor was it a violation of Mother's privacy interests. It may have violated the
custody evaluator's privacy, but Mother claims no standing on behalf of the evaluator,
and it does not appear that she can. Similarly, Mother neither claims, nor could plausibly
claim, standing to sue on behalf of the Wll·elated patient. Accordingly, that collateral
mistake cannot give rise to a duty owed by Therapist toward Mother.
(5) Alle~ation that Therapist "Violated her Ethical Obligations."

This is another hare conclusion by Mot.her, repeatedly asserted with no effort to
support it with legal authority or argument. (Appellant's Replacement Br. pp. 38, 40 n.5,
44.) She is evidently parroting the custody court's comment that Therapist's retrieval of
the children's care records was "highly unethical." (Custody decision ,r 66, R. 172, in
Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 1.) Maybe she means to encompass the custody court's
comment that Therapist's collateral mistakes were "tortious or criminal." (Appellant's
Replacement Br. p. 17 n. 1, pp. 21, 41.)
The defense's best guess is that Mother is placing unjustified reliance on the
custody court's comments and adjectives. After all, her Complaint significantly parrots
such comments verbatim. As just one example: "[Therapist] displayed reckless disregard
for professional boundaries and ruthless pursuit of her agenda, regardless of who may
have been harmed in the process" (Complaint ,r 29, R. 4, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum
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§ 2); and "The court concludes that [Therapist] has displayed a reckless disregard for
professional boundaries and ruthless pursuit of her agenda, reganlless of who may be
harmed in the process" (custody decision 165, R. 171-172, in Appellee's Repl.
Addendum § 1). Mother purports to agree that such "findings are not binding on the
therapist or dispositive of the issuest bul then asserts that the findings "are strong
evidence of the impropriety of the therapist's actions and behavior." (Appellant's
Replacement Br. p. 31 n. 3.)
The district court correctly rejected Mother's effort to utilize the custody court
decision against her:
[Therapist] was not a party to the juvenile court proceedings, was not
represented by counsel, and the issue before that court did not include
causes of action against lTherapist]. Therefore, in mling on this motion, the
Court considers all of [Mother]' s factual allegations antl in fernnces
reasonably drawn therefrom as true, and disregards all of [Mother]' s
statements of conclusions and all findings and rulings by the Juvenile Court.
(Ruling on Mot. to Dismiss, R. 284-285, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 4.) That
rejection was correct under principles of issue preclusion. See Jensen ex rel. Jensen v.

Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ~ 41 (elements of issue preclusion).
Mother is also wrong in her assertion--once again, supported by zero citation to
authority-that the custody court's decision, or any part thereof, is "strong evidence" in
support of her claim against Therapist. To the contrary, with respect to Mother's
malpractice claim, the custody decision is hearsay that is presumptively inadmissible
~

under Utah R. Evid. 801 and 802. Having never offered admissible evidence or
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meaningful analysis in support, Mother's broad allegation that Therapist "violated her
ethical obligations" does not support the imposition of a duty, upon Therapist, that could
support Mother's malpractice claim.
Any determination of whether Therapist violated her own professional and ethical
standards is best left to licensing authorities who have actual experlise in (he
interpretation of those standards. See Krouse v. Bower. 2001 UT 28 ii 16 n.1. 20 P.3d 89:4)
(while defamatory attomey statements were protected by the judicial proceeding privilege

against. civil suit, professional discipline could be appropriate). Arguing the dismissal
motion in the district comi, Therapist's counsel reported., without dispute from Mother's
counsel, that Therapist's alleged misconduct had been reported to the Utah Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing. (R. 347, in Addendum§ 5.) Whatever the
outcome of that proceeding, Mother presents no persuasive rationale to create, from her
nebulous claim of unethical conduct, a duty owed to her by Therapist.

(6): "Tnrtious and even Criminal Acts."
This broadly conclusory statement, also copied from the custody decision, cannot
support imposition of a duty upon Therapist toward Mother. As already explained, the
factually supported instances of collateral mistakes do not constitute wrongs against
Mother, but rather, against other individuals or against the custody court.. And criminal
acts are prosecuted by government prosecutors--supported first by investigation into
facts, and then a determination about whether the provable facts constitute any crime(s).
Neither Mother's nor the custody court's disapproval of how Therapist handled herself, in
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the underlying child custody dispute, justifies imposing a duty, upon Therapist, to support
Mother's ill-conceived malpractice claim.

C: TIDS CASE DOES NOT TURN UPON THE
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING PRIVILEGE.
The defense returns now to questions about the judicial proceeding privilege.
Mother inaccurately implies that the district court dismissed her malpractice claim based
,;;;

on the privilege. She asserts misapplication of the privilege as a separate error, and
devotes much of her brief to arguing that point. (Appellant's Replacement Br. pp. 6, 2944.) But the defense did not seek dismissal based on the privilege. Instead, we argued that
Therapist had no duty toward Mother that could support Mother's malpractice claim. Our
arguments about the judicial proceeding privilege were presented in the "other policies"
factor of our Jeffs duty analysis.
The defense did comment to the district court, as we do to this Court, that the
judicial proceeding privilege may form an independent basis for dismissal. But we have
always recognized that the privilege has limits that can strip protection against some
claims, as happened in Pratt v. Nelson (supra p. 28). And because Mother's actual claim
was for malpractice, not defamation, it was more prudent to challenge the "duty'' element
of malpractice. So it was that the district court dismissed the malpractice claim based
upon its holding that Therapist owed no duty to Mother, and not based upon privilege:
[Mother] claims [Therapist] owes a duty based on her negligent formulation
of forensic opinions while participating in a Court process, while treating
children, gathering infonnation, and presenting testimony in a contested
custody case. The Court finds that treating therapists who testify, do not
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owe a negligence duty of care to the opposing party even [if] it is alleged
that their opinions were negligently formulated.
(R. 292, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 4.) In her long argument on privilege, Mother
really is fishing for an "alternative ground to reverse," which does not exist.
Pursuing that argument, Mother quotes law professor Jeffrey Harrison. Professor
Harrison questions whether the law should protect litigation experts "who overstep the
bounds of their expertise, or, stated another way, is there an ethical basis for protecting
those who do not tell the tmth or pw-posely attempt to mislead?" (Appellant's
Replacement Br. p. 43, quoting J. Harrison, "Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness:
Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed Responses," 18 YALE LAw J. ON
REGULATION Vol.

18:253 (200 I), at p. 312 {in Appellant's Addendum F)).

That query misses the mark in several ways. For one, Professor Harrison does not
address duty and to whom a testifying expert may owe a duty-which is the issue in this
appeal. For another, as explained earlier, the law provides means to exclude experts who
attempt to testify outside their legitimate expertise, or to expose their deficiencies at trial.
(Supra p. 27.) Finally, it is wrong to imply that "overstepping the bounds of one's

expertise" necessarily constitutes dishonesty or purposeful deception. People often
overstep the limits of their actual knowledge by mistake, not on purpose.
Mother's Complaint contains no allegation of dishonesty against Therapist. In
arguing the motion to dismiss, her counsel, after equivocation, conceded that Mother's
malpractice claim is grounded in neglect, not intentional misconduct:
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Q (district court): So I'm analyzing this under whether or not, under a
neglect standard, she's breached a duty?
A: (Mother's counsel): Correct.
(Tr. c1rgument nn Mot.. to Dismiss, p. 24, R. 343, in Appellee's Repl. Addendum§ 5,

emphasis added.)
Before this Court, for the first time ever, Mother insinuates that Therapist did <1cl.
t,.j)

dishonestly, or othe1wise in bad faith: "'For all these reasons, Therapist has separated
herself from the attorney who exercised his duties in good faith (albeit wrongly) in the
course of his services in Moss v. Parr Waddoups." (Appellant's Replacement Br. p. 40.)
Mother is wrong. She never alleged "bad faith" in her Complaint, and effectively
disavowed any such allegation in opposing the motion to dismiss. She cannot present a
different case, to this Court, than she presented to the district court.

CONCLUSION
Under the "negligent forensic opinion" categorization that Mother presented and
the district court accepted, and upon rational application of the Jeffs v. West duty factors
within that categorization, this Court should affirm the district court's holding that
Therapist owed no duty to Mother for purposes of her malpractice claim. This Court need
not consider Therapist's mistakes that fall outside this "negligent forensic opinion"
category, but if it does, it should hold that those mistakes also do not justify imposing a
duty upon Therapist toward Mother. Finally, this Court should reject Mother's effort to
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re-frame this case as an issue of privilege. Accordingly, this Court should AFFIRM the
district court's judgment of dismissa.1.
RESPECT.FULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of March, 2017, by:
EPPERSON & OWENS, P.C.
/s/ J_Kevin Murphy

STEPHEN W. OWENS
J. KEVIN MURPHY {of counsel)
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
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